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Abstract 
 
In expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) for forecasting, the perceived credibility of an expert is 
likely to affect  the weighting attached to their advice.  Four experiments have investigated 
the extent to which the implicit weighting depends on the advisor’s experienced (reflecting 
the accuracy of their past forecasts), or presumed (based on their status) credibility. 
Compared to a control group, advice from a source with a high experienced credibility 
received a greater weighting, but having a low level of experienced credibility did not reduce 
the weighting. In contrast, a high presumed credibility did not increase the weighting relative 
to a control group, while a low presumed credibility decreased it. When there were 
opportunities for the two types of credibility to interact, a high experienced credibility tended 
to eclipse the presumed credibility if the advisees were non-experts. However, when the 
advisees were professionals, both the presumed and experienced credibility of the advisor 
were influential in determining the weight attached to the advice. 
KEY WORDS: source credibility; presumed credibility; experienced credibility; 
advice; forecasting; information use. 
1. Introduction 
The incorporation of experts’ knowledge and judgments into forecasting processes poses a 
number of challenges, many of which are known to researchers who are seeking to improve 
expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) methods (e.g., Aspinall, 2010; Bolger & Rowe, 2014, 
2015; Budnitz et al, 1995; Cooke, 1991; Goodwin & Wright, 2014; Meyer & Booker, 1991; 
Morgan, 2014; Morgan & Henrion, 1990). One of these challenges is the need to assess the 
extent to which credence should be attached to an expert’s forecasts. Concerns like this are 
relevant to the stages of EKE that involve the selection of experts, and to the subsequent 
aggregation of their judgments when multiple experts are available. For example, either 
implicit or explicit differential weights may be attached to individual experts’ judgments, 
depending on assessments of the probable accuracy of their forecasts. Errors made at either 
the selection or aggregation stages have the potential to harm the forecast accuracy. This 
raises the question of what determines the level of credibility that is associated with an 
expert’s forecast. 
This paper investigates the extent to which two attributes of experts – their track 
record of accuracy and their apparent status – influence the credibility of their forecasts. It 
does so by measuring how much either non-experts or other experts revise their own 
forecasts after they have received an advisor’s forecasts. Specifically, we investigate the 
influences of two types of credibility: the expert’s track record as recalled by advisees (which 
we term ‘experienced credibility’) and the expert’s status (which we term ‘presumed 
credibility’). Our paper complements the work of Sah, Moore, and MacCoun (2013), who 
looked at the extent to which an advisor’s track record and their confidence in their advice 
influenced opinion revision. The issues of presumed status and track records are also 
important because, as Armstrong suggested in his “seer sucker” theory, people are often 
motivated to pay large sums for forecasts elicited from people labeled ‘experts’, even when 
their forecasting accuracy is poor (Armstrong, 1980). 
2. Relevant literature 
 
Judgmental forecasts provided by experts are often used to inform people who are forming 
their own opinions of how the future will unfold (Gönül, Önkal & Lawrence, 2006). The 
domain of stock price forecasting is a prime example, being a field where a multi-billion 
dollar industry exists, comprising both forecast providers and forecast users. This field 
contains a great deal of uncertainty, and choosing a relatively inaccurate advisor can have 
serious repercussions, particularly for investments such as retirement savings. Accordingly, 
the credibility of the source of advice is likely to be of paramount importance; but how does 
source credibility influence a user’s assessment of possible future stock prices? Do 
experienced and presumed credibility impinge on these assessments to different degrees, and 
what happens when these determinants yield conflicting indications of credibility? 
Source credibility is an area of active research in many disciplines, including 
psychology, business, marketing, finance, risk communication, and information and health 
sciences (e.g., Berry & Shields, 2014; Chen & Tan, 2013; Gönül, Önkal & Goodwin, 2009; 
Sah et al., 2013; Willemsen, Neijens & Bronner, 2012; Xie, Miao, Kuo, & Lee, 2011). 
Expertise is argued to constitute a critical dimension of source credibility (e.g., Kelman & 
Hovland, 1953). In fact, users have been shown to prefer ‘expert forecasts’ over ‘computer- 
generated forecasts,’ even when they had no information about either the experts or the 
statistical models generating these (actually identical) predictions (Önkal, Goodwin, 
Thomson, Gönül, & Pollock, 2009). 
In most situations, the greater the perceived expertise of the source of advice, the more 
persuasive the advice will be (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Johnson & Izzett, 1969; Kelman & 
Hovland, 1953; Lirtzman & Shuv-Ami, 1986; McKnight & Kacmar, 2007; Pornpitakpan, 
2004; Tormala & Clarkson, 2007). Furthermore, sources with high credibility have been 
found to be more persuasive than those with low credibility (e.g., Rhine & Severance, 1970), 
although there have been contrary findings (e.g., Dholakia, 1986; Dholakia & Strenthal, 
1977). 
The suggested link between the credibility of a source of advice and the resultant 
change in an advisee’s attitudes and judgments is also acknowledged by research on advice- 
taking (e.g. Yaniv, 2004; Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; See et al., 2011; Sah et al., 2013). Van 
Swol and Sniezek (2005) investigated five factors that may affect the acceptance of advice: 
advisor confidence, advisor accuracy, the advisee’s trust in the advisor, the advisee’s prior 
relationship with the advisor, and the advisee’s power to pay for the advisor’s 
recommendations. Of these five factors, advisor confidence was found to have the most 
significant impact. An advisor’s recommendations are more likely to be accepted if he/she 
has confidence in them. However, if feedback on advisor accuracy is also available, that cue 
will dominate, so that confident but inaccurate advisors will be perceived to be less credible 
(Sah et al., 2013). 
Surprisingly little research has focused on the different forms of credibility and the 
potential interactions between them. One form is presumed credibility (Harvey & Fischer, 
1997; Tseng & Fogg, 1999; Harvey, Harries & Fischer, 2000; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Bonaccio 
& Dalal, 2010), which is based on stereotypes and assumptions about the source of the 
advice. For instance, we may assume that a financial advisor will understand more about 
stocks and shares than, say, a taxi driver. Experienced credibility, on the other hand, is based 
on direct experience of the advisor, and results from interactions with them over time (Lim & 
O’Connor, 1995; Tseng & Fogg, 1999; Soll & Mannes, 2011). For example, financial 
advisors who have proved to be highly proficient in the past should eventually attain high 
credibility in the minds of their clients. 
Previous studies that have investigated advisor credibility have involved general 
judgment tasks such as quizzes on computer knowledge (e.g., Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; 
Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005), movie reviews (e.g., Van Swol, 2011), historical events/almanac 
items (e.g., Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004), estimating alumni salaries (e.g., Soll & 
Larrick, 2009; Bonaccio & Dalal, 2010), predicting the outcomes of sports events (e.g., Soll 
& Mannes, 2011), and even estimating people’s weights from photographs (e.g., Sah et al., 
2013). 
To add to this literature, we examine the specific influences of presumed and 
experienced credibility, both separately and jointly, on advisees – who may be either non- 
expert or expert – who are faced with the task of forecasting stock market prices. Two 
experiments were used to investigate the effects of high and low presumed and experienced 
credibility, separately, on the extent to which forecasting advice is influential. Our third and 
fourth experiments then investigated the effects of their interactions on non-experts and 
professionals, respectively. For example, how influential is advice when it is associated with 
high presumed but low experienced credibility? The influence of the advisor was measured 
by the extent to which people changed their initial forecasts in the light of the advice. The 
next sections describe the designs and results of these studies. This is followed by an overall 
discussion which considers the implications of the findings and provides suggestions for 
future research. 
3. Experiment 1 – experienced credibility 
 
Some researchers have argued that experienced credibility is the most complex and reliable 
way of making credibility judgments (Fogg, 1999; Tseng & Fogg, 1999; Wathern & 
Burknell, 2002), and indeed, there is considerable evidence that the accuracy of prior stock 
price forecasts is a key element of provider credibility (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, & Miller, 1999; 
Lev & Penman, 1990). However, of necessity, experienced credibility can only be based on a 
sample of the source’s forecasts, and, in stock market forecasting, it is possible for a short run 
of highly accurate forecasts, achieved through luck rather than skill, to lead to an inflated 
perception of the source’s credibility (Taleb, 2004). Thus, a high experienced credibility is 
likely to be associated with a record of a high accuracy over the forecasts in the sample. 
However, in the evaluation of the source’s credibility, recent forecast errors may be 
overemphasized at the expense of the general performance. Nevertheless, we arrive at the 
following hypothesis. 
 
H1: Advice from a source with a high experienced credibility will have more influence on 
user adjustments than advice from a source with a low experienced credibility, which, in turn, 
will have more influence than advice from a source where the user has no such accuracy 
experience. 
Details of the experiment that we designed to test this hypothesis are given below. 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
The participants were 107 undergraduate business administration students who were taking a 
business forecasting course at Bilkent University.1 Participation led to extra credit points; no 
monetary incentives were given. 
3.2 Design and procedure 
 
Specially designed software based on the VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) platform was 
used to administer the experiment. The software presented the participants with time series 
plots for the weekly closing prices of 25 stocks. These stock prices belonged to real firms, 
and were drawn from the ISE50 (Istanbul Stock Exchange) index, all from the same time 
periods. Each time series plot displayed 30 weeks of past data. The participants were 
 
1 The various experiments reported in current study were conducted with different participants. All three 
groups had similar gender breakdowns (with 45–52% of participants being female) and age compositions (the 
mean age was 22, with a range of 21–23). 
informed that these were real stock price series, but the stock names were undisclosed and the 
time periods concealed in order to prevent framing and extra information effects. The order 
that the time series were presented to the participants was random. 
The initial 12 stocks were used for building experience. For these series, in addition to 
stock price data, the participants were also provided with forecasting advice in the form of a 
point forecast and a 90% prediction interval for the price of the stock in the 31st week, 
together with the actual observed price. During this stage, the participants were only required 
to examine the time series graph, with the provided advice and the realized outcomes (all 
plotted on the one graph), so that they could build their experience about the accuracy, and 
hence, the experienced credibility, of the forecasting source. A sample screenshot for this 
phase is attached in Appendix A. There were three experimental conditions, based on the 
nature of the forecasting advice: 
1. The high experienced credibility group (n = 38): For the initial 12 experience- 
building series, the forecasting advice given to this group was highly accurate. The 
advice was generated statistically, and the error levels were set to have mean absolute 
percentage errors (MAPE) of 2.94% for the point forecasts and hit rates of 10/12 
(83.3%) for the prediction intervals. 
2. The low experienced credibility group (n = 34): The forecasting advice observed over 
the initial 12 experience-building series was relatively inaccurate. The error levels 
were set to have MAPEs of 14.94% for the point forecasts and hit rates of 2/12 
(16.7%) for the intervals. 
3. The control group – no forecasting advice (n = 35): The participants in this group did 
not receive any forecast advice during the initial phase (to avoid building any 
experience about the accuracy of the forecasting source). Thus, for the initial series, 
these participants were only shown the time series plots and the realized outcomes. 
Once these 12 series had been displayed, a single window appeared (for the high and low 
experienced credibility groups only, not for the control group) and summarized the overall 
performances of the forecasting advice provided. Next, a practice time series was provided, to 
help the participants to get used to the interface. Following the practice series, 12 new stock 
price series were displayed. In this phase, for each of the 12 stocks: 
i. The participants were asked to make a one-period-ahead point forecast for the 
stock’s closing price in week 31, with a 90% prediction interval. These forecasts 
constituted the participants’ initial predictions. 
ii. They were then provided with forecasting advice, in the form of a point forecast 
and a 90% prediction interval. Note that all groups received exactly the same 
advice in this second phase. The accuracy level of the advice provided was set 
approximately midway between the high and low credibility levels (MAPEs of 
9.10% for the point forecasts and hit rates of 50% for the interval forecasts). The 
participants were not aware of this, as they were never shown the realized 
outcomes from this phase. 
iii. The participants were then requested to examine the forecasts provided, and to 
revise their initial forecasts if they considered this necessary. A sample screenshot 
from this phase is provided in Appendix A. 
Before each experimental session, the instructions were discussed and detailed 
examples of the use of the software were provided. At the end, each participant was presented 
with a wrap-up questionnaire. 
3.3 Performance measures 
 
For each of the experiments here, two sets of results are reported. The first set reports the 
judgmental adjustments applied to the initial forecasts (both point and interval predictions) 
for each source credibility condition. The second set reports the findings on advice 
utilization. 
 
 
3.3.1 Judgmental adjustments of the initial forecasts 
 
One would expect a direct link between the influence of the forecasting source and the 
judgmental adjustments applied by the participants to their initial forecasts. If the advice 
coming from the forecasting source is perceived to be persuasive, then, in general, the 
adjustments to the initial predictions would be expected to be larger and more frequent for a 
more credible source. 
The frequency of adjustment was measured by the percentage of the initial point and 
interval forecasts that were modified. An alteration to at least one of the upper or lower 
bounds of an interval forecast was counted as an adjustment. The sizes of these adjustments 
were assessed by using different measures for point and interval predictions. The measures 
used are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Judgmental adjustment measures. 
 Frequency of 
adjustments 
Size/magnitude of 
adjustments 
Point forecasts % of initial point forecasts adjusted 
AAP 
absolute adjustment in 
point forecasts 
APAP 
absolute % adjustment in 
point forecasts 
 
Interval forecasts 
 
% of initial interval 
forecasts adjusted 
SAA 
sum of absolute 
adjustments on interval 
bounds 
APAI 
absolute % adjustment in 
interval forecast width 
 
The AAP and SAA measures were used by Goodwin, Önkal & Gönül (2013). The 
APAP and APAI measures have been used in many previous studies (e.g., Gönül et al., 2006; 
Önkal, Gönül & Lawrence, 2008), and were chosen to complement the AAP and SAA scores 
by providing scale-free measurements. All of these scores receive the typical value of ‘0’ 
when the initial forecasts remain unadjusted. The formulae used to calculate these four 
measures are as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = |adjusted point forecast  − initial point forecast | (1) 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = |adjusted upper bound − initial upper bound | + |adjusted lower bound − initial lower bound | (2) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = |adjusted point forecast −initial point forecast | × 100 (3) initial point forecast  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = |adjusted interval width −initial interval width | × 100. (4) initial interval width   
3.3.2 Advice utilization 
 
Three scores for measuring the adoption of advice have been suggested in the literature 
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004; Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006). All of these scores measure the extent to which advice is used by considering how the 
final point forecast is situated relative to the initial point forecast and the point forecast 
provided. 
The three scores are as follows. 
 
i) Advice-shift  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = adjusted point forecast − initial point forecast . (5) provided point forecast − initial point forecast  
In its standard form, this score, which was proposed by Harvey and Fischer (1997), has a 
value between 0 and 1. A score of 0 represents perfect discounting of the advice (i.e., the 
adjusted point forecast is equal to the initial point forecast, meaning that the advice provided 
has no impact on the forecaster), while a score of 1 represents perfect utilization (i.e., the 
adjusted point forecast is equal to the point forecast provided). A score that is smaller than 
0.5 indicates that the final forecast is closer to the initial forecast, while a score over 0.5 
indicates that it is closer to the prediction provided. One disadvantage of this measure is the 
implicit assumption that the adjusted forecast should reside somewhere between the initial 
forecast and the advice provided. Negative values or scores greater than one are often 
considered “extraordinary” cases (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). 
ii) Weight-of-advice (WoA) 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = |𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖|  . (6) |𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖|  
The WoA measure was developed by Yaniv (2004), and is, in fact, simply the advice shift 
score with absolute values of the numerator and denominator. The possible scores and their 
interpretations are very similar to those of the former measure, with the exception that WoA 
can never yield negative values. Thus, extraordinary cases occur only when the score is 
greater than one. 
 
iii) Weight-of-own estimate (WoE) 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 = |𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖|  . (7) |𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖|  
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) suggested this score for measuring advice discounting. Again, 
in its standard form, this measure yields a value between 0 and 1, where 1 represents perfect 
discounting and 0 perfect utilization of the advice. Extraordinary cases are represented by 
scores greater than one. Note that none of these scores are defined for cases where the initial 
and provided point predictions are the same. 
 
 
Table 2: Judgmental adjustments on initial forecasts in Experiment 1. 
Point forecasts 
% of initial point 
forecasts adjusted AAP APAP 
Experienced credibility: high 80.92% 0.35 4.37% (456) (456) (456) 
Experienced credibility: low 
79.90% 0.23 2.91% 
(408) (408) (408) 
Control group 
57.62% 0.22 2.76% 
(420) (420) (420) 
 F2,104 = 6.82, p = 0.002 
η2 = 0.12 p 
F2,104 = 5.75, p = 0.004 
η2 = 0.10 p 
F2,104 = 5.47, p = 0.006 
η2 = 0.10 p 
 
Interval forecasts 
% of initial interval 
forecasts adjusted SAA APAI 
Experienced credibility: high 
86.84% 0.72 25.30% 
(456) (456) (456) 
Experienced credibility: low 85.54% 0.54 19.24% (408) (408) (408) 
Control group 66.67% 0.47 15.53% (420) (420) (420) 
 F2,104 = 5.51, p = 0.005 
η2 = 0.10 p 
F2,104 = 4.39, p = 0.015 
η2 = 0.08 p 
F2,104 = 6.98, p = 0.001 
η2 = 0.12 p 
p 1,67 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
 
 
3.4 Results: judgmental adjustments of the initial forecasts 
 
Table 2 exhibits the frequency and mean size of the judgmental adjustments applied to the 
initial point and interval predictions for each source condition. The F and p-values in Table 2 
relate to one-way ANOVA analyses which take into account the repeated measures design of 
the experiment. They reveal that there are significant differences among the three source 
conditions across all measures for both point and interval forecasts. For point predictions, 
groups that experienced any type of credibility adjusted significantly more often than 
participants in the control group, who received no information from which to build any 
source-related experience (high experienced credibility vs. control group: F1,71 = 10.62, p = 
0.002,  η2  = 0.13; low experienced credibility vs. control group: F =8.12, p = 0.006, η2 = 
0.11; Tukey’s HSD – high experienced credibility vs. control group: p = 0.004; low 
experienced credibility vs. control group: p = 0.007). However, the adjustment frequencies of 
the high and low credibility groups were similar (p > 0.1). 
In terms of the sizes of adjustments, the group experiencing high credibility applied 
larger adjustments to the initial forecasts than either the low experienced credibility group 
(Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.021 for AAP; p = 0.023 for APAP) or the control group (Tukey’s HSD: 
p = 0.007 for AAP; p = 0.01 for APAP). On average, participants who experienced low 
credibility made adjustments of similar sizes to those in the control group (p > 0.1 for both 
AAP and APAP). 
Similar findings apply to the interval predictions. The high and low experienced 
credibility groups had similar adjustment frequencies (high vs. low: n.s., p > 0.1), but these 
groups adjusted significantly more often than the control group (Tukey’s HSD: high vs. 
control: p = 0.009; low vs. control: p = 0.020). The SAA and APAI scores indicate that the 
high experienced credibility group modified their initial intervals by larger amounts than 
either the control group (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.014 for SAA; p = 0.001 for APAI) or the low 
credibility group. However, the difference between the high and low experienced credibility 
groups was not as pronounced as in the case of point predictions (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.1 for 
SAA; p = 0.06 for APAI). When the mean interval adjustments of the low experienced 
credibility group were compared with those of the control group, they were similar in size (p 
> 0.2 for both SAA and APAI). 
 
 
3.5 Results: advice utilization 
 
The advice utilization scores were calculated for all of the initial and adjusted forecast pairs 
except for the rare (9 out of 1284) cases where the initial prediction was exactly equal to the 
forecasting advice provided. In three of these cases, the initial predictions also equaled the 
final forecasts, so they were assigned perfect discounting scores (0 for advice-shift and WoA, 
1 for WoE). The remaining six pairs were omitted from the subsequent calculations. 86.76% 
of all initial and adjusted forecast pairs had scores between 0 and 1 on the WoA and WoE 
measures (1114 pairs out of 1284). The remaining 12.54% of pairs were classified as 
“extraordinary” instances of using external advice. Table 3 shows the scores for advice-shift, 
WoA and WoE for each source condition on the aggregate data (i.e., with the ordinary and 
extraordinary cases combined). 
 
Table 3: Mean advice utilization scores for both ordinary and extraordinary cases in 
Experiment 1. 
 Advice-shift WoA WoE 
Experienced credibility: high 0.42 0.44 0.62 (455) (455) (455) 
Experienced credibility: low 0.18 0.42 0.89 (406) (406) (406) 
Control group 0.18 0.39 0.86 (417) (417) (417) 
 F2,104 = 4.65, p = 0.012 
η2 = 0.08 p 
N.S. p > 0.1 F2,104 = 3.46, p = 0.035 η2  = 0.06 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
The results indicate that the differences in advice utilization across the credibility 
groups were significant. The advice-shift scores suggest that the high experienced credibility 
group shifted their initial forecasts closer to the predictions provided than either the low 
credibility group (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.046 ) or the control group (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.033). 
However, the group that were given advice from the low experienced credibility source did 
not appear to use the advice any differently to the group who were not given any chance to 
acquire experience about the source (p > 0.2). 
Overall, these results suggest that, compared to situations where there is no means of 
assessing a source’s probable accuracy, any experience of a source’s accuracy is likely to 
increase the frequency of adjustments by similar amounts, regardless of what this accuracy is. 
When equipped with no information with which to determine the credibility of the source, 
individuals were more reluctant to modify their original forecasts. 
However, it could be argued that influence can be measured more finely by scores that 
reflect the sizes of the adjustments and the degree of advice utilization. These measures 
indicate that a high experienced credibility leads to a greater influence than a low experienced 
credibility, which is consistent with H1. Also, the source has more influence if a higher 
accuracy of the forecasting source is experienced than if people have no experience of the 
source’s accuracy. This also provides support for H1. In contrast, a low experienced 
credibility did not lead to the advice having less influence than that of the control group, so 
there was no support for this component of H1. Thus, while people in the low experienced 
credibility condition adjusted more frequently than those in the control group, the average 
sizes of their adjustments were similar. 
The wrap-up questionnaire data provide further insights into these results. Rating their 
performance perceptions for the advice provided (on a seven-point scale, with 1 = “very 
poor” and 7 = “excellent”), participants gave mean scores of 4.53, 3.18 and 3.74 for the high 
experienced credibility, low experienced credibility and control groups, respectively. The 
differences among these ratings are significant (F2,104 = 11.28, p < 0.001 , η2p = 0.18), and 
pairwise comparisons indicate that the differences between high and low (Tukey’s HSD: p < 
0.001) and high and control (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.019) are significant, while the difference 
between ‘low’ and ‘control’ is not statistically significant (Tukey’s HSD: p > 0.1). These 
findings provide further partial support for H1, but again, its third component is not 
supported. 
 
 
 
4. Experiment 2 – presumed credibility 
 
The stock market is a domain in which financial advisors earn a living, at least in part, by 
encouraging a presumption of expertise, regardless of their actual track record of success. 
Kahneman (2011) has referred to the ‘illusion of financial skill’, and the fact that people are 
often prepared to pay for advice only on the basis of presumed credibility suggests that it is 
influential (Armstrong, 1980). As Gardner (2011) points out: “As social animals we are 
exquisitely sensitive to status”, and, as such, the perceived quality of advice, and hence its 
influence, are likely to depend to some extent on the status of the source. According to 
expectation states theory, people judge one another on the basis of status characteristics, 
which, in turn, influence expectations about performance competency (for detailed reviews, 
see e.g., Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003). This leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H2 Advice from a source with a high presumed credibility will have more influence on user 
adjustments than advice from a source with a low presumed credibility, which, in turn, will 
have more influence than advice from an unattributed source. 
 
 
Details of the experiment that we designed to test this hypothesis are given below. 
 
4.1 Participants 
The participants were 93 undergraduate business administration students who were taking a 
business forecasting course at Bilkent University. No monetary incentives were given, but 
participation in the study led to extra credit points. 
4.2 Design and procedure 
 
Since this experiment was designed to investigate the influence of the presumed credibility of 
a forecasting source, there were no experience-building series. After a single practice series to 
familiarize the participants with the software interface, participants were given time series 
plots for the weekly closing prices of 12 stocks (the same stocks as in the second phase of 
Experiment 1). As before, the participants were informed that these were real stock price 
series with undisclosed stock names and concealed time periods. There were three 
experimental conditions, depending on the nature of the forecasting advice: 
1. The high presumed credibility group (n = 34): For each series, the forecasting advice 
was presented with a label displaying the message: “Source of this forecast advice is a 
well-known financial analyst with extensive knowledge of stock price forecasting”. 
This was designed to encourage the participants to attribute a high presumed 
credibility to the forecast source. 
2. The low presumed credibility group (n = 31): For each series, the forecasting advice 
was presented with a label displaying “Source of this forecast advice is a taxi 
driver”, so as to foster a low presumed credibility of the source of the forecast 
advice. It is worth noting that it is very common in Turkey (where the experiment 
took place) for the taxi drivers to engage in conversations on the economy and 
financial markets; so the participants treated this as a frequently encountered and 
highly realistic situation. A sample screenshot from the practice series is provided in 
Appendix B. 
3. The control group – no presumed credibility (n = 28): The participants in this group 
received the forecasting advice without any labels, so that no credibility about the 
source could be presumed 
For each stock, the task of the participants was the same as in Experiment 1. Participants in 
all treatments received identical advice, and a wrap-up questionnaire was presented at the end 
of the experiment. 
 
 
4.3 Results: judgmental adjustments of initial forecasts 
 
The frequency and mean sizes of judgmental adjustments for the different presumed 
credibility conditions are displayed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Judgmental adjustments to initial forecasts in Experiment 2. 
Point forecasts 
% of initial point 
forecasts adjusted AAP APAP 
Presumed credibility: high 86.03% 0.39 4.86% (408) (408) (408) 
Presumed credibility: low 72.04% 0.22 2.75% (372) (372) (372) 
Control group 76.19% 0.33 4.10% (336) (336) (336) 
 N.S. p = 0.08 F2,90 = 5.64, p = 0.005 η2 = 0.11 p 
F2,90 = 5.66, p = 0.005 
η2  = 0.11 p 
 
Interval forecasts 
% of initial interval 
forecasts adjusted SAA APAI 
Presumed credibility: high 91.18% 0.83 31.11% (408) (408) (408) 
Presumed credibility: low 77.42% 0.45 17.26% (372) (372) (372) 
Control group 83.93% 0.71 24.39% (336) (336) (336) 
 N.S. p = 0.09 F2,90 = 8.06, p = 0.001 η2 = 0.15 p 
F2,90 = 7.97, p = 0.001 
η2  = 0.15 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
 
 
Table 4 shows that there are significant differences between the three source conditions in the 
size of adjustments. However, while a similar pattern exists for the adjustment frequency, the 
differences among the groups were not strong enough to reach statistical significance. 
In terms of pairwise comparisons, for both point and interval forecasts, the group who 
believed that they had received forecasting advice from a financial expert made larger 
adjustments to their initial predictions than the group who believed that their advice source 
was a taxi driver (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.004 for AAP; p = 0.003 for APAP; p < 0.001 for SAA 
and p < 0.001 for APAI). When the adjustments of the high presumed credibility group were 
compared with those of the control group who did not receive any information about the 
source, the differences in both frequency and size were all non-significant (all p > 0.05). The 
low presumed credibility group, who believed that their forecasting advice was coming from 
a taxi driver, adjusted their initial forecasts less than the control group. However, this 
difference was generally small and attained statistical significance only in the case of SAA 
(Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.029 for SAA). Thus, there was mixed support for H2. 
 
 
4.4 Results: advice utilization 
 
As in Experiment 1, the advice utilization scores were calculated for all initial and adjusted 
forecast pairs except for the cases where the initial and provided forecasts were identical (this 
occurred in only six out of 1116 cases). Of these six pairs, three also had the initial 
predictions equal to the final forecasts, so perfect advice discounting scores (“0” for advice- 
shift and WoA, “1” for WoE) were assigned. The remaining three pairs were omitted from 
the subsequent calculations. 
“Ordinary” cases of advice utilization were evident for 88.35% of all initial and 
adjusted forecast pairs. The remaining pairs constituted the “extraordinary” instances. Table 5 
provides advice-shift, WoA and WoE results for each source condition on the aggregate data 
(ordinary and extraordinary cases combined). 
 
 
Table 5. Mean advice utilization scores for both ordinary and extraordinary cases in 
Experiment 2. (Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in 
each category.) 
p 1,63 p 
 Advice-shift WoA WoE 
Presumed credibility: high 0.47 0.50 0.59 (407) (407) (407) 
Presumed credibility: low 0.24 0.27 0.78 (371) (371) (371) 
Control group 0.40 0.43 0.67 (335) (335) (335) 
 F2,90 = 6.27, p = 0.003 
η2 = 0.12 p 
F2,90 = 6.13, p = 0.003 
η2 = 0.12 p 
F2,90 = 6.23, p = 0.003 
η2  = 0.12 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
 
An inspection of Table 5 reveals that there are significant differences in advice 
utilization among the three presumed credibility groups. All of the scores show that the group 
who believed that they had received advice from a financial expert had much higher 
utilization rates than the group who were told that they have received advice from a taxi 
driver (F1,63 = 13.48, p < 0.001 , η2  = 0.18   for advice-shift , F = 13.24, p = 0.001, η2 = 
0.17 for WoA and F1,63 = 13.06, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.17 for WoE; Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.002 for 
advice-shift, p = 0.002 for WoA and p = 0.002 for WoE). This provides further support for 
H2. However, there was no significant difference between the advice utilization levels of the 
high presumed credibility group and the control group on any of the scores (p > 0.1 for 
advice-shift, WoA and WoE), so again the second component of H2 was not supported. As 
before, advice received from an anonymous source (as was the case with the control group) 
enjoyed slightly (but not significantly) higher utilization rates than advice received from a 
low credibility source (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.07 for advice-shift, p = 0.07 for WoA and p > 0.1 
for WoE). 
Further insights into these results can be gathered from the wrap-up questionnaire data. 
 
When the participants were asked for their perception of the advisor’s performance (via a 
seven-point scale, with 1 = “very poor” and 7 = “excellent”), their mean ratings were 4.65, 
3.19 and 4.18 for the high and low presumed credibility groups and the control group, 
respectively. A one-way ANOVA revealed that these scores were significantly different 
(F2,90 = 9.87, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18). The difference between the high and low presumed 
credibility groups was significant (Tukey’s HSD: p < 0.001), as was the difference between 
the low presumed credibility group and the control group (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.016). 
However, the difference between the high credibility group and the control group was not 
significant (Tukey’s HSD: p > 0.3). These findings are consistent with the results of the 
experiment itself, and provide partial support for H2 
Overall, these analyses reveal that when the presumed credibility of a forecasting 
source is high, the advice received from that source is more influential than that received 
from a source with a low presumed credibility. However, there was no evidence that a high 
presumed credibility led to a greater influence than advice from an unattributed source. This 
finding could be an indication of truth bias (Levine & McCornack, 1991; Levine, Park, & 
McCornack,1999), which refers to the tendency to presume that messages received are true 
rather than untrue, irrespective of the actual accuracy of the information conveyed. The 
presumption of truth is reduced when there is a reason to infer that the message is untrue. 
 
5. Experiment 3 – experienced and presumed credibility 
In many circumstances, people will base their assessment of an expert’s credibility on both 
their experience of the expert’s accuracy (i.e., advice source) and the presumed credibility of 
the source. This raises the question of how the two forms of credibility interact, and, in 
particular, what happens when they give conflicting indications. 
The literature suggests five possible models of the relationship between a satisfaction 
with advice and presumed and experienced credibility. Armstrong’s (1980) ‘seer sucker’ 
theory suggests a ‘presumption-only’ model, where people will be influenced by the advice 
of those who they presume to have the status of experts, irrespective of their track record. 
The predictions of this model are depicted in Figure 1a (the lines are intended to be 
coincidental). This dominance of presumption may arise because people are not motivated to 
examine advisors’ track records. 
At the other extreme is an ‘experience-only’ model, where the presumed credibility has 
no influence when experience of the advice is available. There is some support for this model 
from research in other domains. For example, Brown, Venkatesh, Kuruzovich, and Massey 
(2008) found that expectations had no influence on users’ satisfaction with the ease-of-use of 
information systems; satisfaction depended only upon experience of the system. Similarly, 
Irving and Meyer (1994) found that experiences rather than expectations determined levels of 
job satisfaction. Brown et al. suggested that the predominance of experience may be a 
recency effect, because experience always follows expectations. Indeed, very recent 
experience appears to be particularly influential for forecasting, and a good reputation can be 
lost easily after very few inaccurate forecasts (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Figure 1b 
indicates the predictions of the experience-only model. 
If presumption and experience of advice are both influential separately, then the 
experience + presumption model in Figure 1c may apply. However, there is evidence that 
satisfaction with the advice will depend upon whether the presumption is confirmed or 
contradicted by the experience. Discrepancies between expectations and experiences have 
been examined particularly in relation to satisfaction with products (e.g., Andersen, 1973) 
and information systems (Bhattacherjee, 2001). Research in the two areas has produced 
similar findings. For example, when experience is consistent with expectations, user 
satisfaction with an information system is increased. This occurs even when expectations are 
low, although the satisfaction levels are lower in these circumstances than when high 
expectations are confirmed (Venkatesh & Goyal, 2010). 
Brown et al. (2008) suggest two possible models of the formation of satisfaction when 
such discrepancies arise. In the ‘disconfirmation model’, better-than-expected experiences 
lead to a positive influence on satisfaction, because there is a ‘positive surprise’ effect, while 
worse-than-expected experiences lead to a reduced satisfaction, because there is a 
‘disappointment effect’. This model is consistent with the ‘met expectations hypothesis’, 
which suggests that satisfaction depends on the difference between experiences and 
expectations (e.g., Porter & Steers, 1973). The predictions of the ‘disconfirmation’ model in 
the context of forecasting advice are shown in Figure 1d. In this model, a high experienced 
credibility will always have more influence on the use of advice than a low experienced 
credibility, since the former will raise satisfaction if it is unexpected, while the latter will 
lower it if it is unexpected. Given Venkatesh and Goyal’s (2010) findings, the model also 
predicts that high presumed and experienced credibility will have more influence than low 
presumed and experienced credibility 
However, while a ‘positive surprise’ may have a positive effect on variables such as job 
satisfaction, which are related directly to the happiness of an individual, the same may not be 
true in the case of forecasting advice. Here, a discrepancy between presumption and 
experience may lead to psychological discomfort or cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), 
irrespective of whether the experience is better or worse than expected. In this case, an ‘ideal 
point model’ (Brown et al., 2008) may apply. This model assumes there is an ideal ‘point’ of 
experience where the differences between presumption and experience are at a minimum. 
People do not like to be wrong, and therefore, in contrast to the ‘disconfirmation model’, 
even a better-than-presumed experience will lead to a reduced satisfaction because the 
discomfort of a thwarted presumption exceeds the satisfaction of the positive surprise 
(Carlsmith & Aronson, 1963; Oliver, 1977, 1980; Woodside & Parrish, 1972). The 
predictions of the ‘ideal point’ model for the influence of forecasting advice are shown in 
Figure 1e. Here, the greatest influence on forecasters will be when both the presumed and 
experienced credibility are high, as there will be both a synergistic effect, with each form of 
credibility enhancing the influence of the other, and an absence of cognitive dissonance, 
because the advisees do not experience any psychological discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994; 
Szajna & Scamell, 1993). While a better-than-presumed experience may partly mitigate the 
reduced satisfaction that arises from the discrepancy, an experience that is worse than 
presumed will not serve to reduce this discomfort. Thus, it will reduce the satisfaction even 
more. In a practical context, this reduction in satisfaction may result from annoyance that a 
person described as an ‘expert’ has exhibited a poor performance, with catastrophic effects 
for their credibility. This is reflected in the fact that the ‘low experienced credibility’ line in 
Figure 1e has the greater absolute slope. In this model, it is also possible for the lines to 
intersect, so that low presumed and experienced credibility could have more influence than 
low presumed, high experienced credibility. This seems unlikely, but would arise if there was 
a large amount of dissatisfaction from the discrepant experience. 
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Figure 1. Five models predicting the influence of expert advice. 
(e) Ideal-point (d) Disconfirmation 
5.1 Participants 
 
The participants were 65 undergraduate business administration students who were taking a 
business forecasting course at Bilkent University. As with the previous studies, there were no 
monetary incentives, but participation led to extra credit points. 
5.2 Design and procedure 
 
The design and procedure for Experiment 3 represented a combination of those of the 
previous two studies. As before, specifically tailored software was used to administer the 
experiment. The software presented time series plots for the weekly closing prices of 25 
stocks (the same stocks that were used in Experiment 1), with the same initial 12 stocks 
being used as the experience-building time series. Table 6 exhibits the four experimental 
conditions based on the experienced accuracy and the presumed credibility cues that were 
provided. 
Table 6. Design for Experiment 3. 
 High presumed credibility 
“Source of this forecast advice is a well- 
known financial analyst with extensive 
knowledge of stock price forecasting” 
Low presumed credibility 
“Source of this forecast advice is a taxi 
driver” 
High experienced credibility 
[Initial 12 experience-building series had a 
MAPE of 2.94% for the point forecasts and 
a hit rate of 83% for the intervals] 
 
18 (G1) 
 
16 (G3) 
Low experienced credibility 
[Initial 12 experience-building series had a 
MAPE of 14.94% for the point forecasts and 
a hit rate of 17% for the intervals] 
16 (G2) 15 (G4) 
Note: the numbers in the cells indicate the numbers of participants, with group codes shown 
in parentheses. 
 
The procedure followed by the participants was the same as that in Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
5.3. Results: judgmental adjustments of initial forecasts 
 
Table 7 displays the frequency and mean size of the judgmental adjustments to the initial 
forecasts when both experienced and presumed credibility cues are present at the same time. 
Table 7: Judgmental adjustments on the initial forecasts in Experiment 3. 
Point forecasts 
% of initial point 
forecasts adjusted AAP APAP 
Presumed high, experienced high 77.31% 0.46 5.79% 
(G1) (216) (216) (216) 
Presumed high, experienced low 42.71% 0.17 2.20% 
(G2) (192) (192) (192) 
Presumed low, experienced high 60.42% 0.33 4.12% 
(G3) (192) (336) (336) 
Presumed low, experienced low 
(G4) 
43.89% 
(180) 
0.22 
(180) 
2.88% 
(180) 
 F3,61 = 5.53, p = 0.002 
η2 = 0.21 p 
F3,61 = 6.77, p = 0.001 
η2 = 0.25 p 
F3,61 = 6.40, p = 0.001 
η2  = 0.24 p 
 
Interval forecasts 
% of initial interval 
forecasts adjusted SAA APAI 
Presumed high, experienced high 81.02% 0.91 24.03% 
(G1) (216) (216) (216) 
Presumed high, experienced low 52.60% 0.40 11.97% 
(G2) (192) (192) (192) 
Presumed low, experienced high 64.58% 0.66 20.02% 
(G3) (192) (192) (192) 
Presumed low, experienced low 50.56% 0.46 19.05% 
(G4) (180) (180) (180) 
 F3,61 = 4.97, p = 0.011 
η2 = 0.20 p 
F3,61 = 6.05, p = 0.001 
η2 = 0.23 p 
F3,61 = 3.29, p = 0.026 
η2  = 0.14 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
 
2 × 2 factorial ANOVA analyses which take into account the repeated measures design of the 
experiment were run to investigate the factor effects and the significance of the differences. 
The F-test scores in Table 7 indicate that there exist significant differences among the four 
credibility groups for all six measures considered. 
For point forecasts, the experienced credibility factor had a significant main effect on 
both the frequency (F1,61 = 13.02, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.18) and size (F1,61 = 15.40, p < 0.001, 
η2p 
= 0.20 for AAP; F1,61 =14.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19 for APAP) of adjustments. Neither the 
main effect of the presumed credibility condition nor the interaction effect between 
experienced and presumed credibility were found to be significant (all p > 0.05). Pairwise 
comparisons among the groups revealed that the high presumed and experienced credibility 
group made larger adjustments and adjusted more frequently than the groups experiencing 
low credibility (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G2: p = 0.0043 for the percentage of point forecasts 
p 1,61 p 
p 
p 
adjusted, p = 0.0006 for AAP and p = 0.0008 for APAP; Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G4: p = 
0.0073 for the percentage of point forecasts adjusted, p = 0.0074 for AAP and p = 0.0102 for 
APAP). This may suggest that presumptions about the source do not have much influence 
when the forecasters have a chance to actually experience high credibility (Tukey’s HSD for 
G1 vs. G3: p > 0.1 for all measures). Thus, the results are consistent with an experience-only 
model. None of the other differences between the groups were strong enough to attain 
statistical significance (Tukey’s HSD p > 0.1). 
Parallel findings were obtained for interval forecasts. For the percentage of initial 
interval forecasts adjusted and the SAA scores, the only significant factor was the main effect 
of experienced credibility (F1,61 = 8.95, p = 0.004, η2  = 0.13; F = 13.63, p < 0.001, η2 = 
0.18, respectively). The presumed credibility factor and the interaction effect between the two 
types of credibility were not found to have any impact on these two scores (all p > 0.1). The 
largest and most frequent adjustments to the initial predictions were made when the 
forecasters experienced a high credibility about a source that was presumed to be highly 
credible (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G2: p = 0.0261 for the percentage of point forecasts 
adjusted and p = 0.0016 for SAA; Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G4: p = 0.0172 for the percentage 
of point forecasts adjusted and p = 0.0074 for SAA). Similarly, the presumed credibility did 
not have a significant effect when the experienced credibility was high (Tukey’s HSD for G1 
vs. G3: p > 0.1 for all measures). 
For the adjustment of the initial interval widths, as measured by APAI, both the main 
effect of experienced credibility (F1,61 = 5.37, p = 0.024, η2 = 0.08) and its interaction with 
presumed credibility (F1,61 = 3.89, p = 0.05, η2  = 0.06 ) were significant. The advice was 
least influential when the experienced credibility was low despite the source having a high 
presumed credibility. The pairwise comparisons also support this observation by showing that 
the difference was most extreme between the G1 and G2 (Tukey’s HSD: p = 0.0149 for 
p 1,61 
APAI), whereas none of the other differences, including that between G1 and G3, were 
distinct enough to reach statistical significance (Tukey’s HSD: p > 0.1 for APAI). 
 
 
5.4 Results: advice utilization 
 
As with the previous experiments, the advice utilization scores were calculated for all but a 
single case where the initial point forecast was equal to the advice provided. For this case, no 
adjustment was made to the initial forecast, so scores of 0 for advice-shift and WoA and 1 for 
WoE were assigned. ‘Ordinary’ cases of advice utilization constituted 89.23% of the data. 
Table 8 shows the advice-shift, WoA and WoE for each source condition on the ordinary 
cases. 
 
Table 8. Mean advice utilization scores for ordinary cases in Experiment 3. 
 Advice-shift WoA WoE 
Presumed high, experienced high 0.46 0.45 0.52 
(G1) (18) (18) (18) 
Presumed high, experienced low 0.15 0.16 0.83 
(G2) (16) (16) (16) 
Presumed low, experienced high 0.31 0.31 0.66 
(G3) (16) (16) (16) 
Presumed low, experienced low 0.16 0.18 0.82 
(G4) (15) (15) (15) 
 F3,61 = 9.54, p < 0.001 
η2 = 0.32 p 
F3,61 = 8.69, p < 0.001 
η2 = 0.30 p 
F3,61 = 9.20, p < 0.001 
η2  = 0.31 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of participants in each category. 
 
The F-test scores in Table 8 indicate significant differences among the four groups across all 
advice utilization scores. The 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA reveals a significant main effect of the 
experienced credibility factor (F1,61 = 23.03, p < 0.001, η2  = 0.27  for advice-shift; F = 
20.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25 for WoA; F1,61 = 23.05, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.27 for WoE). In 
addition, neither the main effect of the presumed credibility nor its interaction with the 
experienced credibility were found to be significant (all p > 0.05). As with the results 
observed for judgmental adjustments, the utilization of a source’s advice is the greatest when 
it has high presumed and experienced credibility, relative to a source with a low experienced 
credibility (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G2: p = 0.0001 for advice-shift, p = 0.0002 for WoA and 
p = 0.0002 for WoE; Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G4: p = 0.0003 for advice-shift, p = 0.0006 for 
WoA and p = 0.0004 for WoE). Again, the presumed credibility does not seem to affect 
advice acceptance if the perception about the source formed through experience is high 
(Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G3: p > 0.1 for all measures). 
 
Overall, the results from Experiment 3 generally suggest that when the forecasters have 
presumptions about a source’s credibility and also experience the source’s accuracy over 
time, the perceptions formed through experience dominate. This conforms to the ‘experience- 
only’ model in Figure 1b. The only exception relates to the interval widths, as measured by 
the APAI, where there was a significant interaction between the two types of credibility. It is 
not clear why the results for the APAI followed a different pattern. 
 
6. Experiment 4 – experienced and presumed credibility 
 
The design and procedure of this study were identical to those of Experiment 3; the only 
difference was that it involved professionals as participants. A total of 82 professionals who 
regularly receive or give financial advice in sectors such as banking, finance, defense, energy 
and IT, participated; Table 9 displays the work experience and age details for this participant 
pool. 
Table 9: Design of Experiment 4. 
 High presumed credibility 
“Source of this forecast advice is a well- 
known financial analyst with extensive 
knowledge on stock price forecasting” 
Low presumed credibility 
“Source of this forecast advice is a taxi 
driver” 
High experienced credibility 
[Initial 12 experience-building series had a 
MAPE of 2.94% for the point forecasts and 
a hit rate of 83% for the intervals] 
# of participants : 21 
Mean work XP : 9.3 
Mean age : 32.9 
(G1) 
# of participants : 20 
Mean work XP : 12.1 
Mean age : 35.2 
(G3) 
Low experienced credibility 
[Initial 12 experience-building series had a 
MAPE of 14.94% for the point forecasts and 
a hit rate of 17% for the intervals] 
# of participants : 21 
Mean work XP : 10.8 
Mean age : 34.1 
(G2) 
# of participants : 20 
Mean work XP : 7.4 
Mean age : 31.2 
(G4) 
Note: the numbers in the cells indicate the numbers of professional participants, average years 
of work experience and average age, with the group codes shown in parentheses. 
 
6.1. Results: judgmental adjustments of the initial forecasts 
 
Table 10 displays the F-test scores of the four credibility groups for measures of adjustment 
size, showing significant differences among the groups (APAP, AAP, SAA), with the 
exception of APAI. In terms of adjustment frequencies, all groups’ scores were statistically 
similar. Further 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA analyses, which take into account the repeated 
measures design of the experiment, were run to investigate the factor effects that generated 
these distinctions. 
For point forecasts, both the experienced credibility (F1,78 = 5.08, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.06 
for AAP; F1,78 = 5.65, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.07 for APAP) and the presumed credibility (F1,78 = 
7.79, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.09 for AAP; F1,78 = 7.23, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.08 for APAP) appeared 
to have significant influences on the adjustment size. The interaction effect between 
experienced and presumed credibility was not significant (p > 0.05). Pairwise comparisons 
among the groups revealed that the high presumed and experienced credibility group (i.e., 
G1) made significantly larger adjustments than the group given advice from a low presumed 
credibility source while also experiencing low credibility (i.e., G4) (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. 
G4: p = 0.0034 for AAP and p = 0.0033 for APAP). None of the other differences among the 
groups were strong enough to attain statistical significance (Tukey’s HSD: p > 0.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Judgmental adjustments to initial forecasts. 
Point forecasts 
% of initial point 
forecasts adjusted AAP APAP 
Presumed high, experienced 
high (G1) 
84.92% 
(252) 
0.41 
(252) 
5.05% 
(252) 
Presumed high, experienced low 
(G2) 
79.37% 
(252) 
0.32 
(252) 
3.87% 
(252) 
p 
Presumed low, experienced high 
(G3) 
84.17% 
(240) 
0.30 
(240) 
3.73% 
(240) 
Presumed low, experienced low 
(G4) 
82.08% 
(240) 
0.23 
(240) 
2.78% 
(240) 
 N.S. F3,78 = 4.32, p = 0.007 η2 = 0.14 p 
F3,78 = 4.33, p = 0.007 
η2 = 0.14 p 
 
Interval forecasts 
% of initial interval 
forecasts adjusted SAA APAI 
Presumed high, experienced 96.03% 1.04 139.30% 
high (G1) (252) (252) (252) 
Presumed high, experienced low 90.48% 0.75 92.49% 
(G2) (252) (252) (252) 
Presumed low, experienced high 94.58% 0.82 104.70% 
(G3) (240) (240) (240) 
Presumed low, experienced low 92.08% 0.57 108.80% 
(G4) (240) (240) (240) 
 N.S. F3,78 = 6.85, p < 0.0001 η2 = 0.21 p N.S. 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of observations in each category. 
 
 
For interval forecasts, parallel findings were observed only for SAA scores. For the 
size of the adjustments on the interval bounds (as operationalized by SAA), there were 
significant main effects of both the presumed (F1,78 = 7.34, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.09) and 
experienced (F1,78 = 13.08, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.14) credibility. The interaction effect was 
insignificant. Pairwise comparisons on SAA suggested that the high presumed and 
experienced credibility group made significantly larger adjustments than the groups 
experiencing low credibility (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G2: p = 0.0341; Tukey’s HSD for G1 
vs. G4: p = 0.0002). The presumed credibility did not have a significant effect when the 
experienced credibility was high (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G3: p > 0.1), and the remaining 
pairwise differences were also insignificant (Tukey’s HSD p > 0.1). Interestingly, the 
presumed and experienced credibility factors were not influential in differentiating the sizes 
of interval widths, as measured by APAI. Even though there were distinct adjustments to the 
interval bounds (as designated by SAA scores), the changes in widths between the initial and 
final intervals remained nearly the same across all groups. 
6.2 Results: advice utilization 
 
As in the analyses of previous experiments, the advice utilization scores were 
calculated for all but the rare cases (12 out of 984) where the initial point forecast was exactly 
equal to the advice provided. In three of these cases, the initial predictions were also equal to 
the final forecasts, so they were assigned perfect discounting scores (0 for advice-shift and 
WoA, 1 for WoE). The remaining nine cases were omitted from the calculations. ‘Ordinary’ 
cases of advice utilization constituted 71.24% of the data, and the remaining 28.46% cases 
were classified as ‘extraordinary’. These extraordinary adjustments were not only more 
numerous for the professionals’ predictions than for the students’ predictions, they also 
contained quite extreme cases.  As in the case of the students’ predictions in Experiment 3, 
the subsequent analysis (as displayed in Table 11) was conducted for the ordinary cases of 
advice utilization. 
 
Table 11. Mean advice utilization scores for ordinary cases in professionals’ 
forecasts. 
 Advice-shift WoA WoE 
Presumed high, experienced 0.45 0.45 0.52 
high (G1) (21) (21) (21) 
Presumed high, experienced low 0.36 0.34 0.62 
(G2) (21) (21) (21) 
Presumed low, experienced high 0.34 0.36 0.63 
(G3) (20) (20) (20) 
Presumed low, experienced low 0.25 0.26 0.72 
(G4) (20) (20) (20) 
 F3,78 = 4.28, p = 0.007 
η2 = 0.14 p 
F3,78 = 3.73, p = 0.015 
η2 = 0.13 p 
F3,78 = 3.89, p = 0.012 
η2 = 0.13 p 
Note: the numbers in parentheses indicate the numbers of participants in each category. 
 
 
The F-test scores in Table 11 indicate significant differences among the four groups 
across all three scores. The 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA reveals that there are significant main 
effects of both the experienced credibility factor (F1,78 = 5.60, p = 0.020, η2p = 0.07 for 
advice-shift; F1,78 = 6.32, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.07 for WoA; and F1,78 = 5.25, p = 0.025, η2p = 
0.06 for WoE) and the presumed credibility factor (F1,78 = 7.24, p = 0.009, η2p = 0.08 for 
advice-shift; F1,78 = 4.80, p = 0.032, η2p = 0.06 for WoA; and F1,78 = 6.40, p = 0.013, η2p = 
0.08 for WoE) across all utilization scores. None of the interaction effects are significant (all 
p > 0.05). As with the results observed for judgmental adjustments, the utilization of its 
advice is highest when a source has high presumed and experienced credibility, relative to a 
source with low experienced and presumed credibility (Tukey’s HSD for G1 vs. G4: p = 
0.0033 for advice-shift, p = 0.0072 for WoA and p = 0.0056 for WoE). The remaining 
pairwise differences are all insignificant (Tukey’s HSD: p > 0.1). 
Overall, the professional’s use of advice conformed with the ‘presumption + advice’ 
model (Figure 1c). None of the measures were consistent with the effects predicted by either 
the disconfirmation or ideal points models. 
 
 
6.3 Results: comparisons with findings of Experiment 3 
 
Experiments 3 and 4 were identical except for their participants (i.e., students in 
Experiment 3 vs. professionals in Experiment 4). Thus, a comparison of their findings is 
important in enhancing our understanding of the way in which expert advice is used in 
forecasting. 
In terms of the frequency of adjustments (percentage of initial point and interval 
forecasts adjusted), the professionals consistently adjusted a very high percentage (>79%), 
regardless of the credibility group to which they belonged. The adjustment frequency was not 
influenced by either the experienced or presumed credibility of the forecast source. This is in 
line with extant work (e.g., Önkal & Gönül, 2005; Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & 
Nikolopoulos, 2009), showing that, for a number of reasons, professionals almost always 
intervene to adjust the forecasts they receive. 
The second main difference between the students and professionals was that, for the 
students, the presumed credibility did not have any significant effect on any of the measures 
(except the APAI) relating to the size of adjustments and the utilization of advice when 
experienced credibility was present. Thus, when the students had access to the track record of 
the advisor, this generally eclipsed any considerations of the advisor’s status. In contrast, the 
professionals were influenced by both experienced and presumed credibility. When these 
were low, they both led to significantly larger adjustments and lower advice utilization. 
Hence, the professionals were sensitive to the advisor’s status even when their track record 
was available. Thus, while the students’ use of advice was generally consistent with the 
experience-only model, the professionals conformed to the experience + presumption model. 
The third difference was that the professionals did not make any significant changes 
to the width of their prediction intervals after receiving the advice. Hence, their adjustments 
to the bounds of their intervals served only to shift them to a new location. In contrast, the 
students did make significant changes to the widths of their intervals, depending on the 
interaction between the experienced and presumed credibility of their advisor. 
 
 
7. General discussion 
 
Our four studies indicate that, when considered separately, both the presumed and 
experienced credibility of an advisor/expert can have a significant effect on the extent to 
which users revise their prior forecasts, irrespective of whether these are expressed as point 
or interval forecasts. However, when both forms of credibility are available, the influence of 
the advice differs between non-professional and professional advisees. 
For non-professionals, with the exception of interval widths, there is no evidence that 
the presumed credibility has any influence on advisees when the experienced credibility is 
high. For professionals, who were perhaps sensitive to their own status, the relative status of 
the advisor, as reflected by their presumed credibility, was influential. No evidence was 
found to support either the ‘Presumption-only’ or ‘Disconfirmation’ models. The first of 
these might apply only when advisees are not motivated to examine an advisor’s record or 
have an inaccurate recall of this record. In Experiments 3 and 4, the participants were 
presented with the record just before they made their forecasts. The absence of evidence for 
the disconfirmation and ideal points models suggests that surprises or disappointments, where 
an advisor’s performance differs from that which would be presumed, do not affect the 
influence of advice. For the students, this appears to be because the advisor’s status was 
ignored when their track record was available. On the other hand, the professionals did not 
react to such contradictions even though they were sensitive to the status of the advisor, 
possibly because their experience of  financial forecasting meant that they were  less 
surprised when people with high presumed credibility were found to have poor track records, 
and vice versa. 
No rationale was given for the advisor’s forecasts, so participants’ assessments of the 
expert’s credibility were not confounded with judgments about the plausibility of the reasons 
for the advisor’s forecasts. In the study of presumed credibility (Experiment 2), Tables 4 and 
5 show that people in the control and high presumed credibility groups typically made similar 
adjustments to their initial forecasts, while those in the low presumed credibility group made 
smaller adjustments. Thus, the presumption of a high credibility did not increase the 
adjustments relative to unattributed advice. This suggests that the default position for the 
advice appearing on the computer screen was that it had presumed credibility even if its 
source was unknown, a finding that is consistent with truth-bias. Hence, the information 
about the status of the source only made a difference when it had a negative effect. However, 
even this difference was relatively small, suggesting that the presumed credibility of a source 
based on its status does not have a strong effect. 
A different and stronger effect was found in the case of experienced credibility. Here, it 
was the low experienced credibility group that typically produced forecasts that were similar 
to those of the control group. Thus, experience of highly accurate forecasts enhanced the 
credibility of the source, relative to the control, but being presented with a sample of 
relatively inaccurate forecasts did not detract from it. Several studies have found that people 
have a high propensity to adjust, heavily discount or ignore, provided forecasts, whether they 
come from a statistical method (e.g., Fildes et al., 2009) or a human expert (e.g., Önkal et al., 
2009). At the extreme, discounting can involve totally ignoring advice. Neither the control 
group nor those who experienced inaccurate forecasts from the advisor had any reason to 
attach credibility to the advised forecasts. Hence, they may well have both discounted at this 
extreme level, with their own forecasts replacing the provided forecasts rather than adjusting 
them. Accordingly, an absence of experienced credibility appears to lead to the same effect as 
experience indicating low credibility. Only those experiencing highly accurate forecasts 
would have had any reason to have developed a positive perception of their credibility and to 
have paid some attention to them. 
Overall, experienced credibility was more influential than presumed credibility. In 
Experiments 3 and 4, information on the status of the advisor was displayed on the computer 
screen after the track record of the advisor. This means that explanations based on the greater 
recency of experience cannot apply here. It is more likely that the information on accuracy 
was more congruent with the objectives of the task than the information on status (e.g., 
Bettman & Zins, 1979). The former was displayed in a graphical format, the forecast 
adjustments were made on graphs too, and accuracy was directly relevant to what the 
participants wanted to achieve. Highly accurate or highly inaccurate forecasts would have 
had high levels of salience to the participants, so that the attention paid to the advisor’s 
accuracy would probably have been greater than that paid to their status. 
In all cases, people were generally prepared to change a large percentage of their 
original forecasts when they received the advice, despite receiving no rationale to accompany 
it. To some extent, this may be an artifact of experiments like this. People may feel obliged to 
make adjustments because they feel that this is expected, especially if they have been 
recruited because of their professional status; otherwise, why are they repeatedly being 
invited to make adjustments? However, a similar phenomenon has been found in field 
studies, where professional forecasters have been found to make large numbers of 
unnecessary small adjustments to statistical forecasts, apparently merely to register that they 
are doing their job (e.g., Fildes et al., 2009). 
This work has a number of limitations and could also be extended in several ways. 
 
Business undergraduates may not be typical of the people making stock market forecasts and 
decisions. To some extent, they may be more knowledgeable than typical investors, as they 
will have been taught courses in forecasting and finance. However, since the task did not 
include contextual information like stock names, any expertise that business students had 
about stocks was not directly useful for these anonymous stocks. Nevertheless, both they and 
the professionals were prepared to make judgments on the basis of presumptions about 
expertise that have little empirical justification (i.e., that ‘experts’ produce more accurate 
stock market forecasts) and on the basis of relatively small samples of experienced accuracy. 
Of course, the errors in their forecasts did not carry the risks of financial losses or missed 
gains that would apply in real investing, but their responses to the stimuli, and the informal 
feedback, suggest that they took the task seriously and engaged in it with interest. The 
experiments were conducted as forecasting competitions and we observed that this motivated 
them strongly, as they strove to outperform their colleagues. 
Another potential limitation could involve the experimental design of Experiments 3 
and 4, as these studies did not aim to control for the time spent on manipulation. For 
experienced credibility, the participants may have chosen to spend more time examining the 
performance on the trials, which may then make the experienced credibility more salient; 
whereas for the presumed credibility, the participants are just told about the person’s 
reputation, with potentially limited time being spent on this part of the task. It could be that 
spending more time reading about advisor’s presumed credibility might make it more 
powerful. Further work could benefit from incorporating such manipulation checks, as well 
as from including advisor and advisee confidence as potentially important signals for tracking 
advice use (Sah et al., 2013). 
The experiments involved only three levels of presumed and experienced credibility 
(low, none and high). In future, it may be worth testing the effects at more levels. For 
example, in the context of information systems adoption, Venkatesh and Goyal (2010) found 
non-linear relationships between people’s willingness to adopt systems and a range of values 
of expectations and experience relating to the usefulness of a system. In addition, it would be 
worth exploring the effect of presumed and experienced credibility when the advisor provides 
a justification for their forecast, as this situation is often encountered in practice. 
Along the lines suggested in EKE research, another promising research direction would 
be to investigate combinations of elicited knowledge from multiple experts (Aspinall, 2010; 
U.S. EPA, 2009) or expert panels (Budnitz et al., 1998) under conditions of varying 
credibility levels. This would be especially critical for enhancing the effectiveness of the 
Delphi (Bolger & Rowe, 2014; Rowe, Wright, & McColl, 2005; Bolger & Wright, 2011) and 
scenario (Wright & Goodwin, 2009; Wright, Bradfield, & Cairns, 2013; Önkal, Sayım, & 
Gönül, 2013) methodologies in organizational forecasting processes. Such work promises to 
enhance our understanding of the ways in which forecast users and decision makers actually 
assess expert advice, and how this evaluation process can be effectively supported. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Our studies indicate that, in forecasting, the weighting that is attached implicitly to expert 
advice depends more on the observed accuracy of the advisor than on presumptions about 
the advisor’s status. However, presumptions about the status of the advisor are influential 
when no accuracy track record is available or when professionals are the recipients of the 
advice, rather than students. These results have a number of implications for expert 
knowledge elicitation (EKE). First, there is plenty of evidence that, in many fields, apparent 
expertise is not correlated with forecasting accuracy. Also, more accurate forecasts can be 
obtained from diverse groups of people, some of whom may not be regarded as experts (e.g., 
Tetlock & Gardner, 2015). This suggests that, in forecasting, presumed credibility may often 
be misleading as an indication of the relative value of an expert’s judgments. In these cases, 
EKE methods that protect the anonymity of experts, such as the Delphi method, are likely to 
be advantageous. 
Secondly, both students and professionals were prepared to change their initial 
forecasts on the basis of a limited sample of evidence about the advisor’s track record. This 
was in spite the fact that, especially in financial forecasting, a forecaster’s past record can be 
a very poor guide to their future accuracy (e.g., Taleb, 2004). This suggests that in EKE 
processes, when experts’ judgments are being selected or implicitly weighted, track records 
should only be used when they provide a reliable indication of an expert’s likely future 
performance. When this is not possible, information on track records should be suppressed. A 
better indication of the quality of a judgment may be the rationale that underlies it. The 
circulation of arguments that justify forecasts has been found to lead to improvements in the 
accuracy of forecasts obtained using Delphi applications (Wright & Rowe, 2011). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Experiment 1: Experience-building stage. 
 
Experiment 1: Forecasting – judgmental adjustment phase for the practice series. 
 
Cyan marks: participants’ initial predictions 
Magenta marks: provided forecasting advice 
Yellow marks: final adjusted forecasts given by participants 
APPENDIX B 
 
 
Experiment 2: Practice series for the low presumed credibility group. 
 
Cyan marks: participants’ initial predictions 
Magenta marks: provided forecasting advice 
Yellow marks: final adjusted forecasts given by participants 
